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Abstract
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in
which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated
to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic se-
rial (PS) mechanism that is an anonymous, neutral, Pareto optimal, and weak
strategyproof mechanism when the preferences are considered with respect to
stochastic dominance. The result holds when agents have strict preferences
over individual objects. It has been an open problem whether there exists a
mechanism that satisfies the same properties when agents may have indiffer-
ence among the objects. We show that for this more general domain, there
exists no extension of PS that is ex post efficient and weak strategyproof. The
result is surprising because it does not even require additional symmetry or
fairness conditions such as anonymity, neutrality, or equal treatment of equals.
Our result further demonstrates that the lack of weak SD-strategyproofness of
the extended PS mechanism of Katta and Sethuraman (2006) is not a design
flaw of extended PS but is due to an inherent incompatibility of efficiency and
strategyproofness of PS in the full preference domain.
1. Introduction
In the assignment problem, agents express a complete and transitive set
of preferences over objects and objects are divided among agents according to
these preferences. The problem models one of the most fundamental settings in
computer science and economics with numerous applications [10, 14, 12, 13, 8, 3].
Depending on the application setting, the objects could be car-park spaces,
dormitory rooms, kidneys, school seats, etc. The assignment problem is also
referred to as house allocation [3, 2].
How do we identify desirable assignment rules for the problem? A natural
way is to consider efficiency and strategyproofness with respect to the stochastic
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dominance (SD) relation. SD is a fundamental way to extend ordinal prefer-
ences over individual objects to random allocation because one allocation is
SD preferred over another if it yields more utility with respect to all cardinal
utility functions consistent with the ordinal preferences. We consider two re-
quirements — ex post efficiency and weak SD-strategyproofness. SD-efficiency
is Pareto optimality with respect to the SD relation. It is a weak property since
it is only violated if the improving agent get more utility with respect to all
utility functions consistent with the ordinal preferences. Similarly, weak SD-
strategyproofness is also a weak property since it is only violated if an agent
can misreport their preference and get more utility with respect to all utility
functions consistent with the ordinal preferences.
For the assignment problem, many existing papers assume that the agents
have strict preferences over individual objects. Although strictness of prefer-
ences is natural restriction, it cannot model preferences in which an agent is
completely indifferent among some objects because they have the same quality
that the agent cares about. The most famous mechanism for the problem is
random serial dictatorship (RSD): a permutation of the agents is chosen uni-
formly at random and then agents in the permutation are given the most pre-
ferred object that is still not allocated. Although RSD is strategyproof in the
strongest sense and also ex post efficient (the outcome can be represented as con-
vex combination of deterministic Pareto optimal outcomes), Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [7] showed that RSD is not SD-efficient even for strict preferences where
SD-efficiency is a stronger property than ex post efficiency. They proposed a
rival mechanism called probabilistic serial (PS) that is anonymous, neutral, SD-
efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof.Under PS, agents ‘eat’ the most favoured
available object at an equal rate until all the objects are consumed. When a
most preferred object is completely eaten, agents eat their next most preferred
object that is not completely eaten. The fraction of object consumed by an
agent is the probability of the agent getting that object.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] left open the problem of generalizing PS for the
full domain in which agents may express indifference between objects. The full
domain is a generalization of strict preferences that can also capture other well-
studied preferences restrictions such as dichotomous or trichotomous preferences
in which agents puts the objects in two or three preference classes. Katta and
Sethuraman [11] proposed an extension of PS called EPS that is anonymous,
neutral, and SD-efficient. However they showed that EPS is not weak SD-
strategyproof. Since, the work of Katta and Sethuraman [11], it has been open
whether there exists an anonymous, SD-efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof
random assignment mechanism. Since, PS satisfies the three properties for
strict preferences, it is tempting to think that a rule that satisfies anonymity,
SD-efficiency, and weak SD-strategyproofness would be some other interesting
extension of PS. A random assignment rule is an extension of PS if it returns
the same assignment as PS for all preference profiles in which the preferences of
each agent are strict. However we prove the following which is the main result
of this paper.
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Theorem. For n ≥ 3, there exists no extension of the probabilistic serial rule
that is ex post efficient and weak SD-strategyproof.
The impossibility is startling because it does not even require any fairness
conditions such as anonymity, neutrality, or even equal treatment of equals.
Related Work. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] popularize the use of stochastic
dominance to define efficiency and strategyproofness in probabilistic settings.
They proved that even for preferences in the strict domain, there exists no ran-
dom assignment rule that is SD-efficient, SD-strategyproof, and satisfies equal
treatment of equals. Katta and Sethuraman [11] proved that there exists no ran-
dom assignment rule that is SD-efficient, weak SD strategyproof, and satisfies
SD envy-freeness. Aziz [4] proved that when there are more objects than agents,
there exists no anonymous, neutral, SD-efficiency, and weak SD-strategyproof
random assignment rules. It still remains to be proven whether there exists a
random assignment rule that is anonymous, weak SD-strategyproof, and SD-
efficient for equal numbers of agents and objects.
Brandl et al. [9] have recently proved that for the randomized voting setting,
there exists no anonymous, neutral, SD-efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof
rule settling a conjecture of Aziz et al. [6]. However their result does not imply
that there exists no such rule for a random assignment problem since the random
assignment problem is more restricted and structured than voting.
2. Preliminaries
The model we consider is the random assignment problem which is a triple
(N,O,%) where N is the set of n agents {1, . . . , n}, O = {o1, . . . , on} is the
set of objects, and %= (%1, . . . ,%n) is a preference profile specified by a tuple
of complete and transitive preference relations %i of agent i over objects in O.
A good reference for this setting is [7]. We will denote by R(O) the set of all
complete and transitive relations over the set of objects O.
A random assignment p is an n × n matrix [p(i)(oj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n such that
for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, p(i)(oj) ∈ [0, 1];
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1 for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}; and
∑
oj∈O
p(i)(oj) = 1 for all i ∈ N . The value p(i)(oj)
represents the probability of object oj being allocated to agent i. Each row
p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(on)) represents the allocation of agent i. The set of
columns correspond to probability vectors of the objects o1, . . . , on. A random
assignment is discrete if p(i)(o) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O.
A random assignment rule specifies for each preferences profile a random
assignment. Two minimal fairness conditions for rules are anonymity and neu-
trality. A rule is anonymous if its outcome depends only on the preference
profile and does not depend on the identity of the agents. A rule is neutral
if its outcome depends only on the preference profile and does not depend on
the identity of the objects. A rule satisfies equal treatment of equals if agents
with identical preferences get identical allocations. Note that anonymity implies
equal treatment of equals.
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In order to reason about preferences over random allocations, we extend
preferences over objects to preferences over random allocations. One standard
extension is SD (stochastic dominance). Given two random assignments p and q,
it holds that p(i) %SDi q(i) i.e., a player i SD prefers allocation p(i) to allocation
q(i) if for all o ∈ O:
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
p(i)(oj) ≥
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
q(i)(oj).
Note that SD is incomplete with respect to allocations, hence, it can be the
case that two allocations p(i) and q(i) are incomparable: p(i) 6%SDi q(i) and
q(i) 6%SDi p(i).
An assignment p is SD-efficient if there exists no assignment q such that
q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻
SD
i p(i) for some i ∈ N . A discrete
assignment is Pareto optimal if and only if it is SD-efficient. An assignment is
ex post efficient if it can be represented as a probability distribution over the
set of Pareto optimal discrete assignments.
A random assignment function f is SD-strategyproof if f(%)(i) %SDi
f(%′i,%−i)(i) for all %
′
i∈ R(O) and %−i∈ R(O)
n−1. A random assignment
function f is weak SD-strategyproof if ¬[f(%′i,%−i)(i) ≻
SD
i f(%
)(i)] for all %′i∈ R(O) and %−i∈ R(O)
n−1
. It is easy to see that SD-
strategyproofness implies weak SD-strategyproofness [7].
The following is an example of a random assignment problem in the full
preference domain, along with an example of a random assignment rule to solve
it:
Example 1 (Illustration of the random assignment problem). Consider the
following random assignment problem where N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {o1, o2, o3}.
The preferences are:
%1: o1, {o3, o2}
%2: o2, o1, o3
%3: o2, o1, o3
x =


0.99 0 0.01
0 0.99 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.98

 .
Agent 1 most prefers o1 and then is indifferent between o2 and o3. Assign-
ment x specifies how much fraction of an object an agent gets. For example,
agent 1 gets 0.99 of o1.
RSD is a random assignment rule in which a permutation of agents is chosen
uniformly at random and agents in the permutation successively take their most
preferred available object [1, 7, 5].
4
3. Result
For strict preferences, PS is the only known assignment rule that is anony-
mous, SD-efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof. EPS is the only known gener-
alization of PS [11] to the case of indifferences and it is anonymous and SD-
efficient but not weak SD-strategyproof. In view of these facts, it is tempting
to conjecture that a rule that satisfies anonymity, SD-efficiency, and weak SD-
strategyproofness would be an extension of PS. A random assignment rule is
an extension of PS if it returns the same assignment as PS for all preference
profiles in which all preferences of all agents are strict. However we prove the
following theorem which implies that there is no such extension: For n ≥ 3,
there exists no extension of the probabilistic serial rule that is ex post efficient
and weak SD-strategyproof.
Before we proceed, we introduce a known graph theoretic characterization
of SD-efficiency [11] that we later on use to present a new result about the
relation between SD-efficiency and ex post efficiency. A directed graph G is
a pair of vertices V and directed edges E of type V × V . A path between
two vertices in the graph is a sequence of vertices in V such that each two
consecutive vertices u, v are connected by a directed edge (u, v) in E. A cycle
in G is a path such that the first and last vertex are the same. Intuitively
given an assignment p, we are interested in graphs where V ⊆ N ∪ O and
E ⊆ (O×N)∪(N×O), and in “trading cycles” where objects point to agents they
belong to, according to p, and agents point to objects they prefer at least as much
as the object in the previous edge in the cycle. At least one edge from agent to
object has to denote a strict preference. An assignment p admits a trading cycle
o0, i0, o1, i1, . . . , ok−1, ik−1, o0 in which p(ij)(oj) > 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
oj+1 mod k %j oj mod k for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, and oj+1 mod k ≻j oj mod k
for some j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. We say the cycle has size k because there are
k occurrences of agent/object pairs. Katta and Sethuraman [11] proved that
an assignment is SD-efficient if and only if it does not admit a trading cycle.
Next, we identify an interesting insight about trading cycles that is useful for
our result and may also be of general interest.
Lemma 1. If there exists a trading cycle, then there exists a trading cycle of
size k ≤ n in which there are k unique agents and k unique objects.
Proof. We show that if there exists a trading cycle in which some object is
repeated then there exists a trading cycle of size at most n in which no object is
repeated. Consider a trading cycle using which the allocation of agent i strictly
improves. Let the occurrence of i in which i points to a strictly preferred object
(than the object that points to i) be labeled as i∗. Now consider some object o
that is repeated multiple times in the cycle. As we follow the cycle starting from
i∗, consider the first occurrences of o. There is some agent j who is pointing
to o. Then make j point to the last occurrences of o before i∗. This means
that there is a shorter cycle in which i∗ strictly improved but there is only one
occurrence of object o. By repeating such operations, we can obtain a trading
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cycle in which each object, that occurred in the initial trading cycle, occurs
exactly once.
Now we show that if there is a trading cycle in which some agent is repeated
then there exists a trading cycle in which no agent is repeated. We distinguish
between two types of agents. We first consider an agent who in at least one
occurrence, points to a strictly preferred object than the object pointing to it.
In the second case, we will handle agents who do not satisfy such a condition.
(i) We first consider an agent i that in at least one occurrence points to a
strictly preferred object than the object pointing to it. We denote such
an occurrence of i as i∗, the object that i∗ points to as o∗, and the object
that points to i∗ as o∗∗. We know o∗ ≻i o
∗∗. We distinguish two cases
depending on whether o∗ is a most preferred object of i in the trading
cycle:
• In case o∗ is a most preferred object of i in the trading cycle, we check
if o∗ is the only most preferred object of i. We simply let the last
occurrence of i before i∗ point to o∗ and the number of occurrences
of i in the trading cycle will be reduced by one. If o∗ is not the only
most preferred object of i, we denote another most preferred object
of i as o′. We let i∗ point to o′ and the number of occurrences of i
in the trading cycle will be reduced by at least one.
• For the second case, there must be another occurrence of i, denoted
as i′, other than i∗, which points to the most preferred object of i.
We simply let i∗ point to the object that i′ points to. In this way,
the number of occurrences of i in the trading cycle is reduced by at
least one.
(ii) Now consider an agent j that occurs multiple times and never points to a
strictly preferred object. By definition, the trading cycle contains at least
one occurrence i∗ of some agent i that points to a strictly preferred object.
We trace the cycle starting from i∗. Let the first occurrence of j be j1 and
the last one before i∗ be jℓ. Now if j1 does not own a strictly preferred
object than jℓ, then j1 simply points to the object pointed by jℓ and we
obtain a cycle with only one occurrence of j. The smaller cycle is still
a trading cycle because it contains i∗ that points to a strictly preferred
object than the one it owns. If j1 owns a strictly preferred object than jℓ,
then we make jℓ point directly to the object that j1 points to. We obtain
a cycle in which i∗ is not present and there is one less occurrence of j,
namely j1 is not present, and the improving agent is j in particular the
occurrence jℓ of j.
By repeating this operation to eliminate repeated occurrences of agents we ob-
tain a trading cycle with no multiple occurrences of agents.
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Lemma 2. For n = 3 and allowing for indifferences, the set of ex post efficient
assignments coincides with the set of SD-efficient assignments.
Proof. It is well-known that SD-efficiency implies ex post efficiency [7, 11]. We
now show the converse by contradiction for n = 3. Assume that there exists a
random assignment p that is ex post efficient but not SD-efficient. If p is not
SD-efficient, then by Lemma 1 it admits a trading cycle of size either two or
three in which each agent and object, that occurred in the initial trading cycle,
occurs once.
We first assume that there exist agents 1, 2, and objects a, b such that p
admits a trading cycle b, 1, a, 2 of size two in which, without loss of generality,
the allocation of 1 strictly improves by getting a in exchange for b.
a ≻1 b
b %2 a
We now need to show that there exists some Pareto optimal discrete as-
signment in which 1 gets b and there exists another in which 2 gets a. Let us
assume that there exists some Pareto optimal discrete assignment in which 1
gets b. This implies that 2 gets c and 3 gets a. In order for the discrete assign-
ment to be Pareto optimal, it must be the case that a ≻3 b or else agents 1 and
3 can exchange objects a and b.
a ≻3 b
Now assume that there exists some Pareto optimal discrete assignment in
which 2 gets a. Then 1 must get c and 3 gets b. But then 3 can get a from
2 and give b in return to affect a Pareto improvement. Hence there does not
exist any Pareto optimal discrete assignment in which 2 gets a. Thus, there is
no trading cycle of size two.
We now consider the second case in which there exists agents 1, 2, 3, and
objects a, b, c such that p admits a trading cycle 1, a, 2, b, 3, c, 1 of size three in
which, without loss of generality, the allocation of agent 1 strictly improves by
getting object a. The definition of trading cycle implies the following relations.
a ≻1 c
b %2 a
c %3 b
The trading cycle also implies that there exists some Pareto optimal discrete
assignment in which 1 gets c, there exists some Pareto optimal discrete assign-
ment in which 2 gets a and there exists some Pareto optimal discrete assignment
in which 3 gets b. If there exists a Pareto optimal discrete assignment in which
1 gets c, then 2 gets b and 3 gets a. In order for this discrete assignment to be
Pareto optimal it must be the case that
a %3 c
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or else 1 and 3 can exchange a and c to get a Pareto improvement.
Now let us consider a discrete Pareto optimal assignment in which 3 gets b.
Then it must be that 1 gets a and 2 gets c. In order for the assignment to be
Pareto optimal it must be that
c %2 b
or else 2 can gets some b from 3 in exchange of c.
Now let us consider a discrete Pareto optimal assignment in which 2 gets a.
Then it must be that 1 gets b and 3 gets c. But then 3 can give c to 2 and get
a in return to affect a Pareto improvement. Hence, it cannot be the case that
there exists a discrete Pareto optimal discrete assignment such that 1 gets c, 2
gets a, and 3 gets b.
We have proved that for n = 3, SD-efficiency and ex post efficiency are
equivalent. We use this lemma in the proof of our main result. The lemma also
generalizes Lemma 2 (ii) by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] which is limited to
strict preference profiles. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] prove the statement by
enumerating different classes of preference profiles whereas our proof argument
is different as in our case there many more cases to handle.
Theorem 1. For n ≥ 3, there exists no extension of PS that is ex post efficient
and weak SD-strategyproof.
Proof. Let us consider a random assignment rule f that is an extension of PS
that is ex post efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof for n = 3. Since ex post
efficiency is equivalent to SD-efficiency for n = 3 (Lemma 2), we can assume
that f is SD-efficient. We will show that no such rule exists by deriving a
contradiction.
We focus on the following three preference profiles %,%′ and %′′. The first
two involve only strict preferences.
%1: a, b, c
%2: a, c, b
%3: a, b, c
%′1: a, b, c
%′2: a, c, b
%′3: b, c, a
%′′1 : a, b, c
%′′2 : a, c, b
%′′3 : {a, b}, c
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It can be ascertained that PS outcomes of profiles % and %′ are as follows:
PS(%) =


1/3 1/2 1/6
1/3 0 2/3
1/3 1/2 1/6

 .
PS(%′) =


1/2 1/4 1/4
1/2 0 1/2
0 3/4 1/4

 .
Since f is an extension of PS, it follows that f(%) = PS(%) and f(%′) =
PS(%′). Let us assume that the outcome of f(%′′) is as follows.
f(%′′) =


C1a C1b C1c
C2a C2b C2c
C3a C3b C3c

 .
We first claim that SD-efficiency of f requires that C3a = 0. Assume for
contradiction that C3a > 0. SD-efficiency requires that C1b = 0 and also C2b =
0. But if C1b = C2b = 0, then it implies that C3b = 1. But this is a contradiction
because C3a > 0.
Since we have established that C3a = 0, it follows that:
C3b + C3c = 1. (1)
Weak SD-strategyproofness requires that for all agents each pair of the three
profiles is SD-equivalent or incomparable. Otherwise, the SD preferred profile
could be considered the misreport that is used to cause an improvement. Both
SD-equivalence and incomparability imply the following two conditions for agent
3:
(i) f(%)(3) 6 ≻′′3
SD
f(%′′)(3):
(a) C3a + C3b ≥ 1/2 + 1/3 = 5/6
Since C3a = 0, it follows that
C3b ≥ 5/6. (2)
(ii) f(%′′)(3) 6 ≻′3
SD
f(%′)(3)
(a) 3/4 = C3b and 1/4 = C3c
(b) or 3/4 > C3b
(c) or 1 > C3b + C3c
The first condition (a) cannot hold because of (2). The second condition
(b) also cannot hold because of (2). The third condition cannot hold
because of (1). This leads to a contradiction.
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Hence for n = 3, if f is an extension of PS, and is SD-efficient, then f is not
weak SD-strategyproof. For n > 3, we can adapt the same argument by adding
agents and their corresponding objects. Each agent exclusively prefers their
corresponding object the most. The original three agents are not interested in
these additional objects and have them lower down in their preference list.
In this paper, we proved that there exists no extension of the PS rule that is
ex post efficient and weak SD-strategyproof. Previously, Katta and Sethuraman
[11] presented EPS which is a particular extension of PS and showed that it is
not weak SD-strategyproof. Our result further demonstrates that the lack of
weak SD-strategyproofness is not a design flaw of EPS but is due to an inherent
incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness of PS in the full preference
domain. Moreover, our result is not restricted to rules that employ eating after
tie-breaking in case there are indifferences but to any rule that only coincides
with PS over the strict preference profiles. It still remains to be settled whether
there exists an anonymous, SD-efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof random
assignment rule.
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